Historical and geographic regionalization versus electoral geography  by Haydukiewicz, Lech
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877–0428 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of The 2nd International Geography Symposium-
Mediterranean Environment
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.05.112
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 19 (2011) 98–111
 
The 2nd International Geography Symposium GEOMED2010 
Historical and geographic regionalization versus electoral geography 
Lech Haydukiewicz* 
Pedagogical University of Cracow, ul. PodchorąĪych 2, Kraków 30-084, Poland 
 
Abstract 
The paper aims to accomplish two key goals: 1) The identification of electoral geography as a means of regionalizing geographic space, 
2) The identification of the degree of correlation between social, economic, and political aspects of history and the civilizational and 
cultural factors that shape communities across different regions.  
The paper utilizes long-term trends observed based on election data such as voter turnout and political preferences (voting for specific 
political options). Election data were used to identify and regionalize areas with stable and variable electoral preferences as well as to 
show trends and political shifts in the electorate. 
The research was focused on countries where clear and permanent regional voter turnout patterns and political preferences can be 
observed, including Poland, Romania, Spain, Great Britain, and the Ukraine.  
Other important social factors such as ethnicity, religion, native tongue, and professional background are also considered in the paper, 
which aims to show the degree of correlation between the aforementioned issues and electoral preferences.  
In effect, the paper looks at a wide array of factors that shape permanent differences in the electoral landscape in a number of countries. 
The role of traditional social and demographic factors and their impact on electoral preferences are analyzed, as are key civilizational and 
cultural differences. The differences considered herein are ones that have evolved over the long term, including ones that have evolved 
within ethnically, linguistically, and religiously homogeneous societies 
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1. Introduction 
In countries that possess a universal democratic system of choosing their government there exists a wide array of 
research opportunities based on spatial data collected in the election process. At first glance, it seems that this type of data 
would be rather narrow in scope and devoid of a great deal of variables. Election data normally consist of voter turnout and 
voting results. However, when election data are scrutinized more carefully over a longer period of time and compared to 
other social, economic, and demographic variables for a given region, a formidable amount of new information can be 
inferred. The information can then be used to analyze spatial social structures, their stability or lack thereof.     
The paper looks at the relationship between the history of selected countries and regions and the contemporary array of 
electoral preferences, which are a reflection of the attitudes, political views, social views, and cultural views of selected 
societies.  
The sociological and political sciences normally analyze electoral preferences with respect to characteristics such as age, 
gender, education, place of residence, and income. The purpose of this type of research is to show how ethnic, racial, and 
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religious differences affect political preferences in countries that are ethnically, racially or religiously diverse.   
The paper focuses on a long-term historical perspective in order to show that political divisions within society are not 
necessarily related to ethnic, racial or religious differences among members of society and that political differences do not 
have to reflect contemporary demographic or economic differences.  
Research has shown that in a number of European countries there exist historical grounds for contemporary social 
differences that manifest themselves in varying political preferences that can be classified simply as rightwing and leftwing. 
The paper reviews trends in four countries where the correlation between historical social structures and permanent 
differences in electoral preferences appears to be the strongest: Spain, Poland, Romania, and the Ukraine. The selection of 
these four countries does not imply that other countries with democratically elected governments do not experience similar 
correlations. The countries selected differ in terms of their historical political models. 
The Spanish state formed during two distinct periods of time. The first period of formation was characterized by border 
changes over the course of 750 years (718 AD to 1492 AD) and was associated with one long process – the process of 
liberating Spanish lands from Moslem dynasties. The second period of formation was rather quiet in terms of territorial 
changes and continues to this day.    
Romania consists of two separately evolving parts. The first part includes Walachia (Multenia and Oltenia), Moldavia, 
and Dobruja – areas dominated for centuries by the Ottoman Empire until the middle of the 19th century. The three regions 
then united and formed the independent state of Romania. The remaining part of Romania is called Transylvania∗  and also 
includes a part of the region of Banat. The two regions had belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary starting at the turn of the 
10th century. Both regions were annexed by the Ottoman Empire when it conquered Hungary. The area later changed hands 
again – this time it was the Habsburg Empire that came to control Transylvania and Banat. In 1867, the two regions became 
a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Finally, both regions joined Romania following World War I. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Historical background (changes of borders within countries covered in the paper) 
Poland evolved as an independent state starting in the 10th century. The Kingdom of Poland was partitioned in three 
stages among Russia, Prussia, and Austria in 1772, 1793, and 1795. Poland regained its independence in 1918. In the course 
of its early evolution, Poland lost its western territories in the 12th and 13th centuries. The area would become largely 
Germanized over the course of the next several centuries. Poland reconstituted itself in 1918 from parts of its former self – 
then occupied by Russia, Austria, and Prussia (now called Germany). Finally, Poland recovered its former western 
 
∗ The small regions of Banat, Criúana and Maramureú in northwestern and western Romania are herein treated as parts of Transylvania.  
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territories following World War II.  
The Ukraine is the youngest of the four independent political entities of interest. If attempts to establish an independent 
Ukraine during World War I can be ignored, then the country first entered the international arena as a recognized 
independent state in 1991. The Ukraine includes lands that used to constitute the southern part of Kievan Rus in the early 
Middle Ages. The region later became part of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, which was in a personal union with the 
Kingdom of Poland. In 1569, Poland and Lithuania entered into a real political union, which placed most of the Ukraine 
under Polish rule. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ukraine would become slowly absorbed by Russia. In the late 18th 
century, the part of the Ukraine remaining in Poland would become partitioned by Russia as well as Austria, which came to 
control southwestern Ukraine.    
Following World War I, the western part of modern day Ukraine became a part of Poland until World War II. This 
included the Austrian portion of the Ukraine as well as some parts of western Russia. On the other hand, the Black Sea coast 
of the Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula followed a very different path. Both areas had been under Tatar and Ottoman 
influence until Russia took control of the region at the end of the 18th century. Finally, there is another unique part of the 
Ukraine: Transcarpathian Ukraine. The region shared the political fate of Transylvania until World War I when it became an 
autonomous province of the newly formed Czechoslovakian Republic. Ukraine’s modern day borders were established in 
1945 when it was a part of the Soviet Union. Figure 1 illustrates key political and administrative changes in the countries in 
question Different parts of all four countries in question have followed different historical paths while maintaining a high 
degree of ethnic coherence.   
Table 1 lists the materials on which the paper is based including all national elections but no local elections. Over half of 
the elections are analyzed in this paper (36 out of 66). Only in the case of Spain were elections held prior to the 1990s 
considered. In the three remaining countries, free elections have only been held for the past two decades. Most elections 
were analyzed for Spain, Romania, and the Ukraine, while in the case of Poland, only the most recent elections were taken 
into account. The paper analyzes Poland in greater detail in terms of the most recent elections as well as available in-depth 
information on issues unique to Polish electoral geography. 
Romania 
While the Romanian region of Transylvania (Fig. 2) has had a large Hungarian minority since the 13th century, most of 
the region is inhabited by ethnic Romanians. Yet, when looking at the results of elections and occasional referenda, a 
distinct difference can be observed between Romanian lands that used to be part of the Kingdom of Hungary and those that 
were not. Moldavia and Walachia as well as regions annexed from Hungary are orographically diverse and feature a variety 
of land use types that have evolved over the centuries. Both parts of Romania possess a well developed network of cities 
and similar levels of industrialization. All of Romania experienced the catastrophe of the Stalinist regime to a similar extent. 
Income per capita, employment, and education are similar across Romania, regardless of historical region. Religious 
homogeneity is prevalent across Romania, especially with respect to ethnic Romanians who constitute 89.5% of the 
population. Over 90% of ethnic Romanians claim to be Orthodox Christians.    
Thus, the question that remains is what factors or groups of factors produce permanent political divisions that withstand 
the test of time? 
Parliamentary election results (Fig. 3) show that “post-Hungarian” regions are dominated by parties and coalitions that 
tend to be more conservative and rightwing. These include the Romanian Democratic Convention (ConvenĠia Democrată 
Română – CDR) and the Democratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat-Liberal – PDL). On the other hand, Moldavia and 
Walachia are dominated by parties associated with the socialist left. It is worth noting, however, that the dominant PDSR, 
the Party of Social Democracy (Partidul DemocraĠiei Sociale din România), later renamed the PSD, the Social Democratic 
Party (Partidul Social Demokrat), often forms alliances with smaller parties regardless of their ideology. In some cases, this 
includes conservative parties. An example of this was the Election of 2008, where the PSD party list included the 
Conservative Party (Partidul Conservator – PC), although the dominant force on the ticket was the center-left. In 2008, two 
Bucharest-area election districts were won by the National Liberal Party (Partidul NaĠional Liberal – PNL) whose ticket 
included candidates from the Christian-Democratic National Peasants' Party (Partidul NaĠional ğărănesc Creútin Democrat – 
PNğCD). While this was not a typical situation, the PNL did better in the “post-Hungarian” regions of Romania. The party 
of the Hungarian minority, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România – 
UDMR aka Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség – RMDSz), naturally dominates the small region inhabited mostly by 
Hungarians. The party always does well in the districts of Covasna (Kovászna) and Harghita (Hargita), and in some cases, 
in the districts of Mureú (Maros), Bihor (Bihar), Sălaj (Szilágy), and Satu Mare (Szatmár). The Hungarian minority party is 
rightwing-conservative, as expected.  
A comparison of parliamentary election results with presidential election results strongly suggests that Romania is 
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permanently divided into a central-northwestern part and a southern-eastern part. The former includes the post-Hungarian 
regions of Transylvania, Banat, Criúana and Maramureú. Key Romanian presidential candidates in the last 20 years have 
included postcommunists Ion Iliescu and Mircea Geoană as well as conservatives politicians Emil Constantinescu and 
Traian Băsescu. Conservative politicians have included a man who can be labeled a nationalist, Corneliu Tudor. While his 
economic views resemble socialism, his social views make him a rightwing candidate. Figure 4  shows the results of 
presidential elections for two rounds of voting. Candidates characterized by conservative views, strong links to tradition, 
and patriotic overtones usually win in “post-Hungarian” regions.  
Table 1. Election dates and types; asterisk denotes elections covered in this paper 
Romania during the postcommunist era Spain since the rule of F. Franco 
president parliament EP referendum parliament EP referendum 
1990 1990 2007* 1991 1977* 1987 1976 
1992 1992 2009* 2003 1979* 1989 1978 
1996* 1996*  May 2007* 1982* 1994 1986* 
2000* 2000  Nov. 2007* 1986* 1999 2005* 
2004 2004  2009 1989* 2004*  
2009* 2008*   1993* 2009*  
Poland during the postcommunist era 1996*   
president parliament EP referendum 2000*   
1990 1991 2004 1996 2004*   
1995 1993 2009 1997 2008*   
2000 1997  2003* Ukraine since gaining independence 
2005* 2001   president parliament referendum 
 2005   1991* 1994 1991* 
 2007*   1994* 1998* 2000 
    1999* 2002*  
    2004* 2006*  
    2010* 2007*  
 
Fig. 2 Romania, Hungarian Minority  
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Fig. 3 Romania, Parliamentary Elections, winner 
 
Fig. 4. Presidential Elections, winner 
The rest of the country tends to vote for postcommunists. There are just a few exceptions and they are usually found in 
the capital city of Bucharest and its suburban zone. Another exception is the province of Dobruja, which is a region 
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historically distinct from Moldavia and Walachia.Leftwing candidates never win in post-Hungarian regions, with one 
exception, the Election of 2000. Corneliu Tudor, an ultra-nationalist candidate, suffered a decisive loss to Ion Iliescu in the 
second round of voting. Tudor garnered only 33.17% of the vote on a national scale. Nevertheless, differences in support for 
Iliescu could be observed between the “leftwing” and “rightwing” parts of Romania. Tudor only won in one region, the 
BistriĠa-Năsăud. The proof for society’s perception of Tudor as an ultra-nationalist lies in the way the Hungarian minority 
voted in the election. His opponent, Iliescu, garnered the largest amount of electoral support in Hungarian minority districts 
– over 80% – in the second round of voting.    
Figure 5 shows the winners in elections to the European Parliament. Parties that are perceived as better equipped to face 
stronger Western European countries in order to defend the Romanian national interest are more likely to win European 
Parliamentary elections. The leftwing PSD party garners less support in EU parliamentary elections than in Romanian 
national elections not only in conservative regions but also in Dobruja, eastern Walachia, and in 2009 in Bukovina. Areas 
historically inhabited by Hungarians normally support the UDMR. In 2007, an independent Hungarian candidate, Pastor 
László TĘkés, won in the district of Covasna (Kovászna).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Romania, European Parliament Elections, winner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Romania, Referenda 
In April of 2007, leftwing parties attempted to impeach President Traian Băsescu and were able to force him to suspend 
his duties. The Romanian Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the Romanian Parliament and remanded the matter to 
Romanian society. On May 19, 2007, a national referendum was held – the result of which was a resounding “no” to the 
removal of the President. Yet, the voting results still mirrored the cultural differences discussed earlier (Fig. 6).  
The percentage of voters opposed to the removal of Băsescu was higher in conservative regions. A referendum was held 
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in October of 2007 and was designed to allow voters to choose new election laws and a system of single-mandate districts 
(Fig. 6). The new election system was supported by 81.36% of voters. The main opponents of the new system were small 
political parties that were afraid of losing seats in the Parliament. Once again, the country was divided into a rightwing part, 
strongly supporting the new system, and a leftwing part, which supported the creation of single-mandate election districts. 
The leftwing did not come out in force and lost the referendum. The Hungarian minority, which normally supports niche 
parties, did not vote in line with conservative voters. Only a small percentage of Hungarians voted for the changes proposed 
in the referendum.       
The Ukraine 
For the first time in its history, Ukrainian society is participating in a stable democratic process of electing government*. 
Ukraine’s democratic system has now lasted two decades. What was unique about the early years of Ukrainian democracy 
was the fact that the country had been under Soviet rule for 70 years and Communist influence remained strong. In light of 
this, the first (partly free) parliamentary elections (1990) ** were decisively won by the Communist Party, which took 
advantage of its substantial administrative, logistical, and financial power. Another factor that played an important role was 
the pro-Soviet attitude of large segments of society, especially those in the industrialized East.      
The most relevant of cultural divisions in modern day Ukraine are rooted in the religion-based Union of Brest of 1596. 
Other important historical events included Polish-Russian border changes in the 17th and 18th centuries. Finally, the 
Partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795 left an imprint on the Ukraine. As a result, virtually all of modern day Ukraine 
came under Russian rule. Only the districts of Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and parts of the Chernivtsi district came 
under Austrian rule (see Fig. 1). Christian Orthodox dioceses in the Western Ukraine, which had been under the growing 
influence of Latin civilization since 1569, joined the Catholic Church in 1596. However, as the Polish state continued to 
lose lands in the East, Ukrainian dioceses began to switch back to their Orthodox roots under Russian rule. It is important to 
mention that Turkish areas conquered by Russia at the end of the 18th century were never under any Polish, Latin or 
Catholic influence. The Greek Catholic religion brought to the area in 1596 survived in an organized sense only in the part 
of the Ukraine annexed by Austria. Moreover, the region controlled by Austria in the 19th century was autonomous, which 
allowed contemporary Ukrainian identity to slowly develop. This diverse state of religious and cultural affairs evolving 
since the 18th century appears to be one of a number of important determinants of political divisions in the Ukraine, with 
the extreme East-West division being the most polarizing one.     
All election results show a strong degree of social polarization in the Ukraine (Fig. 7). Parliamentary election results 
since the Communist Party was made illegal in 1991 and legal again in 1993 illustrate the existence of virtually two separate 
societies. The population of western Ukraine, which was a part of Poland in-between the world wars, is characterized by a 
well-defined Ukrainian identity with a strong nationalist flavor. In this part of the Ukraine, political parties that preach 
patriotism, historical politics, a dislike of neighbors such as Poles and Russians, and generally conservative views enjoy 
widespread support. It is interesting to note that the continued existence of the Greek Catholic Church cannot be credited for 
this state of affairs, although it is still considered to be the national church of the Ukraine. The northern region of Volhynia 
is mostly Russian Orthodox. This has been the case since Russia came to control the area following the third partition of 
Poland. No leftwing party, including the Communist Party itself, has ever won an election in this area starting in 1990. 
Rightwing parties tend to win elections in this part of the Ukraine. This includes the People’s Movement, the Our Ukraine 
Party of Viktor Yushchenko, and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. It is interesting to note that the line between districts won by 
the Communist Party and the People’s Movement in 1998 closely follows – with the exception of several townships in 
Volhynia – the pre-World War II eastern Polish border. On the other hand, the seemingly culturally similar region of 
Transcarpathia has followed a different political path. The area had been a part of Hungary prior to World War I.  
Despite the coexistence of Russian Orthodox and Greek Catholic Christians in the region, Transcarpathian Ukrainians 
are less willing to support rightwing and nationalist parties. While the region has often voted in line with neighboring areas, 
it remains politically diverse and shares some characteristics with western and eastern Ukrainian society. Rightwing parties, 
centrist Social Democrats, and the eastern Ukrainian Party of Regions all have had a chance to win elections in this part of 
the country. A large remaining part of the Ukraine had voted Communist until the late 1990s. Another political option 
preferred in this area was the Socialist and Peasants’ Party, later renamed the Socialist Party. The region has made a 
transition over the last 10 years to a South versus East model. The East still supports the left-leaning pro-Russian Party of 
Regions, which draws the bulk of its support in the Russianized industrial regions of the eastern Ukraine as well as the area 
 
* Certain departures from standard Western European democratic behaviors were noted, especially during the second round of voting in the 2004 
presidential elections. This triggered the famous Orange Revolution and a repeat of the second round of voting in 2004.     
** Not taken into account in this paper. 
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between Kamieniec Podolski and Sumy. All parliamentary elections following 1998 have mirrored this electoral geography 
and the divisions have become even deeper.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Ukraine, Parliamentary Elections, winner 
In the case of presidential elections (Fig. 8), the divided nature of Ukrainian electoral geography has been apparent since 
the very beginning. Only in the Election of 1991 was there a national consensus that the Social Democratic candidate, 
Leonid Kravchuk, should become president. The only exception in this case were three Greek Catholic districts in western 
Ukraine, which supported a rightwing-nationalist candidate put forth by the People’s Movement, Andriy Chornovil. In 
1994, the presidential election was won by the pro-Russian leftwing candidate, Leonid Kuchma, who was supported 
primarily by eastern and maritime electoral districts. The opponent in 1994 was L. Kravchuk, who went on to win the 
support of western Ukrainians in the following elections mainly because he was the most acceptable candidate. The 
remaining candidates were either Communists or Socialists – Petro Symonenko and Oleksandr Moroz – who enjoyed 
support in the East. The 2004 and 2010 elections mirrored and even simplified established voting patterns with rightwing, 
conservative, and nationalist candidates (Viktor Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, respectively) versus the Party of Regions 
candidate, Viktor Yanukovych.  
The shift of central Ukrainian society in the political direction of western Ukraine appears to have produced a permanent 
boundary between the two political camps. That boundary runs along the eastern edge of the Greek Catholic faith in the 
Ukraine – a vestige of the early 17th century. This correlation may be a coincidence, however, it may also be a good subject 
for further research. 
In order to better understand the difference between eastern and western Ukraine, it makes sense to look at the first 
democratic vote in 1991, which was a referendum on the subject of Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union. Figure 
9 shows the referendum results as well as the level of interest in the form of voter turnout. Clearly, a majority of the 
population supported independence. At the same time, it is also clear that pro-Ukrainian views were the strongest in the 
Greek Catholic west and the weakest in the east and Crimea, where just over 50% of voters supported independence.    
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Fig. 8. Ukraine, Presidential Elections, winner 
Poland 
A characteristic feature of Poland, versus the two countries discussed previosuly, is its continuous existence as a political 
entity from the 10th century until the Partitions at the end of the 18th century when three neighboring powers, Prussia, 
Russia, and Austria, decided to successively annex parts of Poland. The country regained its independence in 1918. The 
great era of industrialization affected different parts of Poland in different ways, as each occupying power developed 
industrial potential at a different rate. The same was true of the social evolution accompanying industrialization. Another 
major event in Poland’s history was Poland’s annexation of large areas in the west. The region was inhabited primarily by 
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Germans who were forced to relocate to western parts of Germany. The newly annexed western lands were then populated 
by a diverse mix of people from different parts of the country including areas annexed by the USSR in 1945.  Today, it is 
possible to identify several distinct parts of Poland that differ in terms of culture and these differences are starting to become 
reflected in electoral choices. It is important to note that the number of leading political parties in Poland is declining, which 
means that political polarization continues to take root. Given that contemporary Polish society is quite homogeneous in 
terms of ethnicity, language, and religion, the only meaningful difference can be of a historical nature. It is the history of the 
different parts of Poland that helps shape the social and occupational structure of Polish society.   
 
Fig. 9. Ukraine, Independence Referendum 
Fig. 10 shows 2007 parliamentary election results on four out of six diagrams. Political parties shown on the last diagram 
(Civic Platform – PO, Law and Justice – PiS, Polish Peasant* Party – PSL, Left and Democrats – LiD) are shown on 
previous diagrams as the leftwing-liberal option (PO and LiD) and the conservative-populist option (PiS and PSL). The 
conservative-populist option is seen as the primary choice in regions without a relocated population – regions with long 
cultural traditions – as well as in regions with a higher than average rural population engaged in agriculture. In central, 
eastern, and southeastern Poland, the conservative-populist option garners less support in large cities and their suburban 
areas as well as small areas with a Lithuanian and Belarussian minority (Podlaskie Province). Another region where support 
for conservatives and populist is smaller is the Bieszczady mountain region where the local Ukrainian and Rusin population 
was expelled from following World War II. Western Poland as well as the regions of Kujawy (Kuyavia) and Wielkopolska 
(Greater Poland) tend to support liberals (PO) and the leftwing (LiD). The aforesaid regions are strongly urbanized and 
industrialized, but most importantly, they are diverse to the point of homogeneity with most inhabitants having had arrived 
following World War II. Parliamentary election results closely mirror presidential election results. The liberal candidate, 
Donald Tusk, won most of western Poland and at the same time lost most of eastern Poland to rightwing candidate, Lech 
Kaczynski.    
Social differences in Poland are the result of the separate paths taken by different regions of the country since the late 
18th century as well as the relocation of selected local populations following World War II. The aforesaid differences are 
stronger than contemporary political differences and reach the cultural and religious level. This can be observed by looking 
at Poland’s referendum on its entry into the European Union in 2003. The districts that opposed Poland’s union with other 
European nations were those whose populations had not been forced to move following World War II. Most had been part 
of Russia and Austria following the partitions of Poland in the 18th century. Western Poland, a region without much cultural 
and historical baggage, tends to be more liberal, more pro-European, less conservative, and less religious.      
Spain 
Spain has experienced a longer period of real democracy (since the Franco government) than have countries in Eastern 
Europe. Another key characteristic of Spain is the fact that contemporary cultural differences can be traced to political and 
administrative changes in the Middle Ages and up to the early 16th century. The newly united Spain (16th century) began to 
interfere in the political fate of other regions. At the same time, Spain gradually became a political anachronism that 
continued to maintain old regional differences. The liberation of the Iberian Peninsula from Moslem rule lasted from 718 
AD to 1492 AD. Settlement patterns, land use, property rights, and estate growth were just some of the elements of the 
 
* The terms Peasant, Popular, and Populist are often used interchangeably in the literature. 
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evolving Spanish state during this era.          
The acquisition of new territories** in the south produced a new class of inhabitants – people who did not own land and 
simply worked the land as hired labor. On the other hand, the northern part of the country has a strong tradition of land 
ownership. The Catholic Church is also quite strong in this region. The rightwing parties that enjoy substantial support in 
the north are: the People's Party (Partido Popular – PP) and its predecessors, the Union of the Democratic Centre (Unión de 
Centro Democrático – UCD), the People’s Coalition (Coalición Popular – CP), and the Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular – 
AP). The south is dominated by the leftwing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE).  
 
 
Fig. 10. Poland, Elections, winner and Entry into the EU Referendum 
An additional feature of the Spanish political scene are numerous and powerful local political groups, especially in 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and the Canary Islands. In addition to voting for their local political groups, cultural, ethnic, 
 
** For more information, see Roman Szul in his publication: Influence of historical determinants on electoral behaviors. Reflections on the electoral 
geography of Poland and Spain; Polish Electoral Space, Warsaw 2003  
Lech Haydukiewicz / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 19 (2011) 98–111 109
and language minorities tend to offer more support to leftwing parties, which translates into additional support for the PSOE 
party. This type of preference by minorities tends to be the norm, as also shown in the case of Romania, the Ukraine, and 
Poland. Figure 11 illustrates support for the PSOE and rightwing parties over the course of 30 years. While electoral 
fluctuations to the left or right can be observed depending on the overall political mood, the left can be seen as a dominant 
force in southern Spain, while the northern part of the country tends to be more conservative (minority areas aside). 
Virtually identical voting patterns can be observed in European Parliamentary elections, as seen in Figure 12. Andalucia, 
Estremadura, and most of Castillia – La Mancha tend to offer steady support to the leftwing. 
 
Fig. 11. Spain, Parliamentary Elections, winner 
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Fig. 12. Spain, European Parliament Elections, winner 
 
Fig. 13. Spain, Referenda 
 
Fig. 14. Spanish Civil War – situation on september 1936 
Figure 13 shows the results of referenda. The first referendum was held in 1986 and concerned Spain’s entry into NATO. 
Regional political entities opposed Spain’s membership in NATO as did nationalist groups with substantial support in 
Catalonia and the Basque Country. Southern Spain, a left-leaning region, offered more support for Spain’s entry into NATO 
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than did the more traditionalist northern part of the country. Another referendum was held almost 20 years later – in 2005 – 
and involved the European Constitution. Once again, left-leaning individuals were more likely to support the Constitution, 
this being the result of a more international orientation. Individuals closely tied to their traditions and their local regions – 
their “homelands” – and having a closer relationship with the Catholic Church were less likely to support the creation of a 
European superstate. This type of attitude was prevalent in northern Spain and certain regions inhabited by minorities.   
Figure 14 offers some interesting insight into non-election issues, as it illustrates the political situation in Spain 
immediately following the outbreak of the 1936 uprising against the Communist and anti-religious Republican government. 
The regions that immediately joined the uprising were regions that had traditionally supported the rightwing. This indicates 
that the cultural diversity of the Spanish population – rooted in the distant past – continues to be nurtured and remains a 
deeper divide than party politics. 
Summary 
Four countries, each with a different history as well as a variety of administrative and cultural characteristics, illustrate 
just how important historical determinants can be in shaping contemporary social structures. It is often difficult to capture 
the moment of transition from history to the nature of social structures resulting from specific political events in the distant 
past. In certain cases, such as the case of the Ukrainian region of Volhynia, it is difficult to speak of specific regional social 
and economic structures that would influence political preferences and voter turnout. It is important, however, to consider 
current election results in a historical context, as this helps in the understanding of well-established spatial processes and 
preferences.   
On the other hand, when looking at local differences in electoral preferences, it is possible to identify some specific 
events in the political past that may continue to exert surprising influence on contemporary political events. Upon thorough 
investigation, one example of this may be the influence of Latin civilization in the form of the Union of Brest on large parts 
of central Ukraine.    
 
